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THE ELUSIVE PROTECTED CLASS - WHO IS WORTHY UNDER
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your office takes on two new clients, both claiming disa-
bility discrimination in employment.' Interestingly, both clients have simi-
lar learning disabilities. 2 In spite of their various limitations, these
individuals have each worked hard and succeeded in many personal and
professional endeavors. 3 After much persistence, they acquired promising
positions in their established fields. 4 Upon beginning their new jobs, the
clients each explained their learning disabilities to their respective supervi-
sors and asked for various accommodations to allow them to perform the
essential responsibilities of their new positions. 5 Client A requested more
time to complete projects, a special computer program to help with organ-
ization and a voice recorder so that he could "take notes" orally.6 Unlike
Client A, Client B took medication to help him compensate for his disabil-
1. For a brief background discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), see infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
2. The term "learning disability" is not synonymous with "disability" as de-
fined under the ADA. See Frances M. Nicastro, Note, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Determining Which Learning Disabilities Qualifyfor Reasonable Accommodations, 26J.
LEGIS. 355, 370 (2000) (distinguishing learning disabilities from disabilities under
ADA). This Casebrief uses the term "learning disability" in its general common
meaning in educational practice. The Department of Education defines "specific
learning disability" as:
a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in
understanding or in using language, spoken or written, that may manifest
itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to
do mathematical calculations, including conditions such as perceptual
disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and devel-
opmental aphasia.
34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c) (10) (i) (1999). Some characteristics of learning disabilities
include "a significant discrepancy between aptitude and actual achievement...
academic deficiencies or decreases in motivation level, memory, attention span,
social skills, perceptual skills, or other cognitive abilities." See Nicastro, supra note
2, at 370. For a greater discussion of the statutory definition of "disability" under
the ADA, see infra notcs 26-48 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's stance on the relationship between
personal achievements and ADA protection, see infra notes 90-104 and accompany-
ing text.
4. For a comparison to the facts of Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharm., which is high-
lighted in this Casebrief, see infra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of reasonable accommodations under the ADA, see infra
notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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ity. 7' While the medication helped him cope with his limitations to a cer-
tain degree, Client B still needed extra time to accomplish his assignments
and consequently requested deadline extensions.8 Unfortunately for both
clients, their employers refused to provide them with the requested ac-
commodations and subsequently fired them for failing to perform their
work efficiently. 9 Hoping to find an answer for these clients, you turn to
the Americans with Disabilities Act' only to find its umbrella of protec-
tion is not wide enough to cover both clients; only Client A is likely to be
deemed worthy of protection under the Act."
Unlike race, sex, color, national origin, religion or even age, "disabil-
ity" is not defined to be all-inclusive. 1 2 It is the elusive protected class,
causing practitioners and clients alike to struggle to fit into its awkward-
shaped box.13 Enacted in an effort to address the "serious and pervasive
social problem" of disability discrimination, the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 ("ADA") aimed to prevent unfair treatment of those with
disabilities in areas such as employment, housing, public accommoda-
tions, education and access to public services. 14 While the theory behind
7. For examples of mitigating measures, such as medication, see infra notes
49-72 and accompanying text.
8. For examples of reasonable accommodations, see infra note 46 and accom-
panying text.
9. For a discussion of employer's liability for discrimination of disabled indi-
viduals, see infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
10. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-17 (West 2006).
11. This Casebrief will address the differentiation between individuals who
use artificial mitigating measures such as medication and individuals who develop
cognitive coping skills to self-accommodate their limitations. See infra notes 105-
38 and accompanying text.
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects all individuals from dis-
crimination in employment "because of [the] individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2006). The Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") protects persons at least forty years of
age. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 631 (a) (West 2006) (defining ADEA's protected class). Liti-
gation under these statutes tends to focus on the merits of the discrimination, not
on whether the plaintiffs are included within the protected classes as is the case
with the ADA. See John D. Ranseen & Gregory S. Parks, Test Accommodations for
Postsecondary Students, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 83, 88 (2005) (noting that "ADA
litigation has focused extensively on the issue of inclusion"); Julie McDonnell,
Note, Sutton v. United Air Lines: Unfairly Narrowing the Scope of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 39 BRANDErs L.J. 471 (2000-01) (comparing ADA to other anti-dis-
crimination statutes).
13. For a discussion of the complicated nature of the ADA's statutory lan-
guage, see infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
14. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (a) (West 2006) (listing congressional findings re-
garding ADA); see also Stephanie A. Fishman, Note, Individuals with Disabilities but
Without Mitigating Measures, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 2013, 2018-19 (2000) (discussing his-
tory of ADA).
1032 [Vol. 51: p. 1031
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this statute's protection was broad, courts have continuously narrowed its
scope by interpreting its ambiguous terms.'
5
In recent years, the Supreme Court has brought some clarity-as well
as much frustration-to the definition of "disability," holding that mitigat-
ing or corrective measures should be taken into account when evaluating
plaintiffs' claims. 16 Subsequently, a cloud of confusion has developed in
interpreting what measures constitute mitigation under the ADA.1 7 In Em-
ory v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals,'8 the Third Circuit gave plaintiffs a glim-
mer of hope by asserting that learned accommodations and achievements
do not negate a claim of disability. 19
This Casebrief identifies the Third Circuit's stance towards cognitive
coping mechanisms and self-accommodation in defining "disability" under
the ADA, as distinguished from artificial mitigating measures. 20 Part II
examines the history and development of the ADA and its protected
class.2 1 Part III analyzes Emory and its reasoning in applying ADA protec-
tion to self-achieving individuals. 22 Part IV considers the Third Circuit's
stance in light of Supreme Court decisions on mitigation 23 and highlights
unanswered questions on the scope of ADA protection. 24 Finally, Part V
emphasizes the impact of the Emory decision for disabled plaintiffs in the
15. SeeJ.J. Knauff, Article, Dissing Disabilities: A Student's Duty to Mitigate Mala-
dies, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 85, 94 (2001) (discussing ambiguous nature of ADA);
see also Fishman, supra note 14, at 2022 (noting ambiguity).
16. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); Murphy
v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555 (1999). For a discussion of mitigating measures and the ADA's protected
class, see infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., 283 F.3d 11, 30-31 (1st Cir.
2002) (detailing compensating efforts of genetic amputee with only one com-
pletely functioning arm); Nordwall v. Sears Roebuck, 46 F. App'x 364, 367-68 (7th
Cir. 2002) (discussing diabetes mitigation by use of insulin shots and dietary moni-
toring); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 308-09 (3d Cir. 1999) (ad-
dressing possibility of ADA protection in light of lithium treatments).
18. 401 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2005).
19. See id. at 181 (focusing on obstacles plaintiff confronts in determining
applicability of ADA).
20. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of ADA protection and
distinction of cognitive coping skills from mitigating measures, see infra notes 90-
152 and accompanying text.
21. For a general discussion of the ADA and its developing interpretations,
see infra notes 26-72 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Emory, see infra notes 73-
118 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion distinguishing the Third Circuit's analysis in Emory from
the Supreme Court's stance on artificial mitigation, see infra notes 119-38 and ac-
companying text.
24. For a discussion of the existing gaps in the analysis of the ADA's protected
class, see infra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
10332006] CASEBRIEF
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Third Circuit and provides suggestions for practitioners whose clients fall
through the ADA's cracks.
25
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADA
A. Statutory Language
Finding that approximately forty-three million Americans have at
least one physical or mental disability and recognizing a history of isola-
tion and segregation in this country, Congress created the ADA to serve as
a "national mandate for the elimination of discrimination" against dis-
abled individuals. 26 The ADA's protection extends to qualified individuals
with a disability, defining "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being re-
garded as having such an impairment. '2 7 With many ill-defined, ambigu-
ous terms, the ADA has led to an array of litigation, causing courts to
struggle with interpreting its phrases. 28
25. For a summary of the Third Circuit's stance on mitigating measures and
self-accommodation, see infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 2006) (emphasizing increasing number of
disabled persons as population grows older and need for prevention of discrimina-
tion). In its legislative findings, Congress stated that despite improvements, disa-
bility discrimination continued to be "a serious and pervasive social problem,"
particularly in areas such as "employment, housing, public accommodations, edu-
cation, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health ser-
vices, voting and access to public services." See id. § 12101 (a) (2-3) (asserting
congressional findings leading to ADA enactment). Ultimately, Congress recog-
nized that the "continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal
basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably
famous." See id. § 12101(a)(9). Under the ADA, no covered entity can engage in
discrimination against a disabled individual "in regard to job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensa-
tion,job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." See
id. § 12112(a).
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 2006) (defining disability). See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12111(8) (West 2006) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2006) (providing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
guidelines defining ADA terms). This Casebrief will focus on the first prong of the
ADA's definition of disability. See infra notes 28-48 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the second and third prongs, see Debra Burke & Malcolm Abel, Arti-
cle, Ameliorating Medication and ADA Protection: Use It and Lose It or Refuse It and Lose
It, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 785, 800-02 (2001) (explaining possible employer liability fol-
lowing Sutton trilogy) and Amy M. Kimmel, Note, Insulin: Can't Be Disabled with It-
Can't Live Without It, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 753, 768-69 (2001) (addressing "record
of" and "regarded as" in diabetes cases).
28. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (in-
terpreting "major life activities"); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (ad-
dressing "substantial limitations"); Spencer v. Verizon Connected Solutions, 138 F.
App'x 449, 450-51 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing "major life activities"); Reeves v.John-
son Controls World Servs., 140 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining statutory
interpretation of "major life activity"); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138,
1034 [Vol. 51: p. 1031
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CASEBRIEF
1. Physical or Mental Impairment
While not defined by the ADA, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") has issued regulations defining impairments. 2 9
The phrase "physical or mental impairment" encompasses:
(1) [a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the follow-
ing body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal
cardiovascular, reproduc-tive, digestive.. . and endocrine; or (2)
[a] ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities.
3 0
Though seemingly inclusive, proving that one has an impairment is only
the first step in achieving protection under the ADA.31
2. Major Life Activity
The EEOC regulations also provide a list of possible major life activi-
ties, including "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, see-
ing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working."3 2 In its ADA
145-46 (3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting "qualified individual"); Colwell v. Suffolk
County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 641-45 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying three-step pro-
cess for determining disability as set forth in Bragdon); see also Fishman, supra note
14, at 2022 (noting ambiguous nature of ADA); Knauff, supra note 15, at 94
(same).
29. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2005) (establishing EEOC's position in defin-
ing impairments). The definition of "impairment" is "sufficiently broad to ensure
that no serious question of application arises in the vast range of cases." See Sa-
muel L. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability", 86 VA. L. REv. 397, 407-08
(2000) (addressing "impairment" term of disability definition). Some conditions,
such as pregnancy, obesity and genetic predisposition to disease, implicate greater
consideration of the expansive nature of "impairment." See id. (indicating condi-
tions which "press the boundaries of the 'impairment' concept"). Congress did
not intend the ADA to cover "minor, trivial impairments," "mere physical traits,
such as eye or hair color," nor "any nonphysical, nonmental impairments, such as
'environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantages.'" See Mary Crossley, The
Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 635-36 (1999) (citing S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 22 (1989)) (discussing ADA's definition of "impairment").
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2005) (defining physical or mental impairment).
See Andrew M. Cohcn, Black & White & Gray All Over: Recent Supreme Court Develop-
ments and the Determination of Who Is "Disabled" Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 18 No. 2 ACCA DOCKET 60, 61-62 (2000) (discussing impairments); Knauff,
supra note 15, at 90 (same).
31. For a complete discussion of ADA's protected class as established by stat-
ute, see supra notes 26-30 and infra notes 3248.
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2005) (defining major life activity). The regula-
tions provide an illustrative list of activities which may constitute major life activi-
ties; they do not conclusively define "major life activity." See Bagenstos, supra note
29, at 410-11 (discussing ambiguity of "major life activity" term). One commenta-
tor explains that each of the listed activity's importance to an individual's life
makes it an illustrative "major life activity." See id. (asserting possible connection
between activities listed). The first seven daily activities listed are "essential to sur-
2006] 1035
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interpretations, the Supreme Court has recognized several activities not
listed, thus noting the purely illustrative nature of the EEOC regulation
list.3 3 For example, in Bragdon v. Abbott,34 a woman with Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus ("HIV") sued her dentist under the ADA after he in-
sisted on filling her cavity at a hospital where the woman would have to
pay an additional fee.3 5 In acknowledging HIV as her disability, the Court
accepted reproduction as a major life activity in which she was substan-
tially limited.3 6 Later, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams,3 7 the
Court defined "major life activities" as "those activities that are of central
importance to daily life."3 8 In Toyota, the Court granted the employer's
vival and to taking advantage of most economic and social opportunities in our
society." Id. (examining listed activities). The last two activities, "learning" and
"working", though not necessarily performed daily, are "an important part of [a
person's] personal development and self-actualization-and indeed [his or her]
personhood itself. . . ." Id. (same).
33. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999) (finding
that major life activity of working requires substantial limitation in broad class of
jobs, not single position); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) (noting that
"reproduction is a major life activity for the purposes of the ADA"); see also Pack v.
Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing major life activity
of sleeping); Cohen, supra note 30, at 62 (discussing activities that courts have
previously accepted or rejected as major life activities); Knauff, supra note 15, at 92
(addressing EEOC regulations regarding major life activities).
34. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
35. See id. at 628-29 (stating facts and procedural history of case). Upon dis-
covering the plaintiffs cavity, the dentist informed the plaintiff of his policy
against filling cavities of patients with HIV. See id. at 629 (reporting facts). While
he offered to fill the cavity at a hospital with no additional fee for his services, the
plaintiff would have to pay for the use of the hospital facilities. See id. (same). The
plaintiff filed suit under the ADA, alleging disability discrimination in a place of
public accommodation. See id. (noting procedural history and defining "public
accommodation" to include "professional office of a health care provider").
36. See id. at 638 (stating that "[r]eproduction falls well within the phrase 'ma-
jor life activity"'). Plaintiff's claim asserted that the HIV virus "placed a substantial
limitation on her ability to reproduce and to bear children." Id. at 637 (defining
plaintiff's major life activity). In his opinion, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, ChiefJustice Rehnquist questions the Court's acceptance of
reproduction as a major life activity. See id. at 659 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (analyzing Court's acceptance of reproduction as major
life activity). He compares reproduction to other important life decisions, such as
"who to marry, where to live, and how to earn one's living," none of which are
considered major life activities. See id. at 660 (discussing reproduction). Rehn-
quist states that the common thread linking the activities on the illustrative list is
that "the activities are repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day exis-
tence of a normally functioning individual." See id. (expressing commonality be-
tween listed activities). According to Rehnquist, reproduction does not qualify
under this common thread. See id. (disagreeing with Court's acceptance).
37. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
38. Id. at 197. Toyota involved a plaintiff with bilateral carpal tunnel syn-
drome and bilateral tendonitis who was terminated allegedly due to poor attend-
ance. See id. at 187, 190 (noting facts of case). The plaintiff argued that her
employer had failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations to allow her
to perform her job. See id. at 187 (stating claim).
1036 [Vol. 51: p. 1031
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summary judgment motion because the plaintiff could not prove that her
carpal tunnel syndrome substantially limited her in the major life activity
of performing manual tasks and thus, she was not considered a member of
the protected class.39 While arguments continue over what daily activities




Each plaintiff seeking protection under the ADA must be individually
assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether he or she has a disa-
bility; there are no per se disabilities under the statute.4 1 In comparison
to an average person in the general population, a disabled individual, be-
ing substantially limited in a major life activity, must be unable to perform
a major life activity or "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner
or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity." 42 The determination of whether an impairment is substantially
limiting focuses on factors such as the nature and severity, the duration
and the permanent or long term impact of the impairment. 43 The Su-
preme Court, however, has maintained that "[t]he Act addresses substan-
tial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities." 4 4
Consequently, courts are required to engage in careful consideration of all
39. See id. (describing plaintiff's claim). Because she was not substantially lim-
ited in the performance of a class of manual activities, the Court held that she
could not receive protection under the ADA. See id. at 193-94 (explaining plain-
tiff's failure to make viable claim).
40. See, e.g., id. at 196-97 (discussing "substantial limitations"); Bragdon, 524
U.S. at 641 (same); Furnish v. SVI Sys., 270 F.3d 445, 450-51 (7th Cir. 2001)
(same); Russell v. Clark County Sch. Dist., No. 98-17194, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
17460, *3-4 (9th Cir. July 17, 2000) (evaluating plaintiffs limitations). For a
greater discussion of the "substantially limits" requirement of the ADA, see infra
notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
41. See Cohen, supra note 30, at 62 (discussing individualized assessment of
whether impairment is "substantially limiting"); see also Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199 (stat-
ing that "[a] n individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is particu-
larly necessary when the impairment is one whose symptoms vary widely from
person to person").
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2006) (defining "substantially limits"); see Co-
hen, supra note 30, at 62 (same); Fishman, supra note 14, at 2022-23 (same);
Knauff, supra note 15, at 90-91 (examining EEOC regulations on "substantially
limits").
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2) (2006) (listing factors for consideration in de-
termining whether person is substantially limited in major life activity). The EEOC
guidelines specifically propose that determinations of substantial limitations in-
clude consideration of "(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he
duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or
long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting
from the impairment." Id.; see also Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 790 (noting
factors in "substantial limitation" analysis); Cohen, supra note 30, at 62 (same);
Kimmel, supra note 27, at 752 (same).
44. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641 (discussing "substantial limitations"). "Substan-
tially" indicates "'considerable' or 'to a large degree."' Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196-97
2006] CASEBRIEF 1037
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surrounding circumstances and relevant factors in determining the degree
to which the impairment of a particular individual limits his or her major
life activity.
4 5
4. A Qualified Individual with a Disability
Even after an individual establishes that he or she has a disability, to
fall within the ADA protected class, the individual still must prove that he
or she is "qualified," meaning that the individual "can perform the essen-
tial functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires" with or without reasonable accommodations. 46 An employer who
fails to provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified individual may
be liable under the ADA.4 7 In evaluating whether a disabled individual is
qualified, courts tend to defer to an employer's determination of what
constitutes the essential functions of the position.
48
(citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1976)) (defining
"substantially" in "substantially limited").
45. Cf Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S.
at 64142 (1998)) (explaining that "[w]hether a person has a disability under the
ADA is an individualized inquiry").
46. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 2006) (defining "qualified individual
with a disability"). Under the ADA, an employer must provide a disabled individ-
ual with reasonable accommodations if such accommodations would enable the
individual to perform the essential functions of the job. See Fishman, supra note
14, at 2024-25 ("The ADA mandates that the employer make any reasonable ac-
commodations necessary to... enable [the disabled individual] to enjoy the equal
opportunities that are available to other employees."). Reasonable accommoda-
tions in employment include 'job restructuring, part-time or modified work sched-
ules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9)
(West 2006). Under Title III of the ADA, reasonable accommodations in educa-
tion may include extra time for examinations, adaptation of the manner in which
examinations are given, large print or Braille examinations for visual impairments
or even physical accommodations such as table height adjustments. See Knauff,
supra note 15, at 93 (listing examples of reasonable accommodations for individu-
als with learning disabilities).
The Seventh Circuit has stated that an employee requesting a reasonable ac-
commodation for his or her disability must "show that the accommodation is rea-
sonable in the sense both of efficacious and or proportional to costs." See Vande
Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (using cost-benefit
analysis for determining reasonableness).
47. See Fishman, supra note 14, at 2024-25 (explaining employer liability).
The employer may assert a defense of undue hardship to avoid providing such
accommodations. See id. at 2025 (recognizing that employer is not liable under
ADA for failing to provide accommodations if it would pose "undue burden" on
employer). Undue burden or hardship consists of actions involving "significant
difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10) (West 2006). For a discussion of
"undue hardship" and its relation to "reasonable accommodation," see U.S. Air-
ways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
48. See Fishman, supra note 14, at 2024 (noting judicial deference).
1038
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B. Sutton, Murphy and Albertson's: The Supreme Court's
Stance on Mitigating Measures
Unlike those bringing suit under other anti-discrimination statutes,
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, plaintiffs have struggled to unravel the complicated
ADA requirements necessary to prove that they are protected,49 often be-
ing dismissed on summary judgment before they even get to the merits of
their claims.50 In 1999, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases that
sharply narrowed the scope of ADA protection, 51 holding that mitigating
or corrective measures must be taken into account in evaluating whether
an individual is disabled. 52
In Sutton v. United Air Lines,53 twin sisters, both suffering from severe
myopia, filed suit against United Air Lines after the airline refused to hire
them as pilots due to their inability to meet the minimum vision require-
ment.54 In its analysis, the Court held that the sisters were not disabled
49. See Cohen, supra note 30, at 60 (arguing that " It] he ADA remains the only
federal discrimination statute in which the protected class cannot easily be iden-
tif[ied]"); see also Ranseen & Parks, supra note 12, at 88 (noting extensive focus of
ADA litigation on "issue of inclusion"). For a discussion of other anti-discrimina-
tion statutes and their protected classes, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187, 202 (2002)
(reversing Sixth Circuit's denial of summary judgment, based on respondent's lack
of substantial limitation in major life activity); Guzman-Rosario v. United Parcel
Serv., 397 F.3d 6, 9-11 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming district court's grant of summary
judgment due to lack of evidence of substantial limitation); Sullivan v. Neiman
Marcus Group, 358 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming grant of summaryjudg-
ment due to lack of showing of substantial limitation); Nordwall v. Sears Roebuck,
46 F. App'x 364, 368 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's grant of summary
judgment as plaintiff was not substantially limited); cf Collins v. Prudential Inv. &
Ret. Servs., 119 F. App'x 371, 376, 381 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming district court's
grant of judgment as matter of law as plaintiff was only moderately limited).
51. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999) (addressing rela-
tionship of mitigation to ADA protection); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S.
516, 521 (1999) (same); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999)
(same); see also McDonnell, supra note 12, at 474, 482-83 (stating that "[w]hether a
court considers mitigating measures in an ADA claim defines the scope of the
ADA's coverage").
52. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83 (considering mitigating measures in evaluat-
ing disability); Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (same); Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66
(same); see also Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 785 (stating holding of trilogy
cases); Cohen, supra note 30, at 60 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)) (explaining that "[t]he ADA 'does not reach the legions of people
with correctable disabilities"'); Fishman, supra note 14, at 2014 (discussing out-
come of Sutton). Mitigating measures are "devices used by an individual to combat
the effects of his or her impairment, such as medicines or auxiliary aids." McDon-
nell, supra note 12, at 473-74 (defining mitigating measures). Examples of mitigat-
ing measures include hearing aids for the hearing impaired and insulin injections
for diabetics. See id. at 474 (providing examples).
53. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
54. See id. at 475-76 (discussing facts and procedural history). Each twin's un-
corrected visual was "20/200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her
left eye." Id. at 475 (describing impairment). United Air Lines required its pilots
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under the ADA because their impairment, corrected by the use of glasses
or contacts, did not substantially limit a major life activity. 55 The Court
stated that the effects of mitigating measures, used by an individual to cor-
rect his or her mental or physical impairment, "must be taken into ac-
count when judging whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a
major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act."5 6
Prior to Sutton, both the EEOC and the Department of Justice
("DOJ") had issued interpretive guidelines, calling for the assessment of
disability without regard to mitigating measures. 5 7 Seven circuit courts
supported this interpretation, with only two courts, the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits, holding otherwise. 5 8 Even the ADA's own legislative history sup-
at a minimum to have an "uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better." Id. at
476 (stating employer's requirement).
55. See id. at 488-89 (asserting holding of case). "[W]ith the use of corrective
lenses, each [twin] has vision that is 20/20 or better." Id. at 475. Without the
corrective lenses, the twins cannot see effectively to engage in various activities;
however, "with corrective measures, such as glasses or contact lenses, both function
identically to individuals without a similar impairment." See id. (emphasizing prac-
tical effect of corrective measures).
56. See id. at 482 (concluding that evaluating individuals in hypothetical un-
corrected states would be "impermissible interpretation" of ADA).
57. See Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 793-94 (examining view of EEOC and
DOJ prior to Supreme Court trilogy); Fishman, supra note 14, at 2026 (noting
Supreme Court's rejection of EEOC guidance); McDonnell, supra note 12, at 477-
78 (addressing guidelines of EEOC and DOJ). Prior to the Sutton trilogy, the
EEOC guidelines stated "that 'the determination of whether an individual is sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis,
without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices.'" See Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 794, 794 n.31 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. § 1630.29(j) (1999)). For example, under the guidelines, a diabetic re-
quiring insulin shots would be substantially limited because he or she could not
perform major life activities without the insulin. See id. (noting examples from
EEOC regulation).
58. See Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 794-95 (explaining federal appellate
court divide on issue of determining protected status of qualified individual with-
out regard to "ameliorating measures"); McDonnell, supra note 12, at 474 (ex-
plaining circuit split regarding mitigating measures prior to 1999); see also Sutton,
527 U.S. at 495-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Arnold v. United Parcel Serv.,
136 F.3d 854, 866 n.10 (1st Cir. 1998)) (claiming that if eight of nine Federal
Courts of Appeals and all three Executive agencies issuing regulations or interpre-
tive bulletins construe definition of disability without ameliorative measures, that
should be rule). The Third Circuit adopted the view that protected status should
be determined without regard to mitigating measures in Matczak v. Frankford Candy
& Chocolate Company, 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997). See Burke & Abel, supra note 27,
at 794-95, 795 n.37 (referencing Matczak, 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997)).
The First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits also endorsed
evaluation of disabilities without regard to mitigation. See Burke & Abel, supra
note 27, at 794-95, 795 nn.35-36 & 38-41 (referencing Arnold v. United Parcel
Serv., 136 F.3d 854, 861 (1st Cir. 1998); Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs,
156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Baert v. Euclid
Beverage Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1998); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d
624, 628 (8th Cir. 1997); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996);
Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1996)). Only the
Sixth and the Tenth Circuits maintained the opposing view, later adopted by the
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ported the interpretation of "disability" without considering mitigating ef-
forts.5 9 Despite this, the Sutton Court interpreted the ADA on its face,
considering its present tense language, its emphasis on individualized in-
quiry and the congressional findings on which it was based.60 While the
dissent sounded the narrowing of ADA protection and the exclusion of
particular groups from the statute's scope (such as those who use pros-
thetic limbs), the majority insisted that the "use of a corrective device does
not, by itself, relieve one's disability"; rather, "one has a disability under
[the first prong of the ADA] if, notwithstanding the use of a corrective
device, that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity." 6 1
Supreme Court, that mitigating measures were relevant to the disability deterrmina-
tion. See Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 795, 795 nn.42-43 (referencing Gilday v.
Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined
by Guy, J., discussing majority opinion on issue of mitigating measures)).
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit developed a hybrid approach to the issue, hold-
ing that "only serious impairments and ailments that are analogous to those men-
tioned in the EEOC Guidelines and the legislative history-diabetes, epilepsy and
hearing impairments-will be considered in their unmitigated state." See Burke &
Abel, supra note 27, at 795 (quoting Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., 152
F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1998)).
59. See, e.g., Nicastro, supra note 2, at 366 (recognizing House and Senate
committee reports as interpretive guides available to Court); see also McDonnell,
supra note 12, at 478 (discussing ADA's legislative history). The Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee Report stated that disabilities "should be assessed
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures" and the House Judiciary
Committee Report reached the same result, assessing disability "without consider-
ing mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations."
See id. at 478, 478 nn.51-52 (referencing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) and H.R.
REp. No. 101-485(111), at 28 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451).
60. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 14, at 2030-31 (examining Sutton Court's
analysis). First, in looking at the plain language of the statute, the Court noted
that the use of the present tense form of "substantially limits" suggests that individ-
uals are to be considered in their present, not hypothetical, state. See id. at 2030
(focusing on form of statutory language). If an individual is using medication to
cope with his or her impairment, he or she may not be presently "substantially
limited" in a major life activity. See id. (discussing Court's analysis). Second, failing
to consider ameliorative measures when assessing a medicated plaintiff's impair-
ment would require courts to engage in guessing games to determine how the
plaintiff is affected without such mitigation. See id. at 2030-31 (identifying Court's
second argument). This would conflict with the requirement of individualized,
case-by-case consideration. See id. (asserting second rationale for consideration of
mitigating measures in disability analysis). Finally, the Court focused on the Con-
gressional findings that forty-three million Americans have at least one disability.
See id. at 2031 (noting Court's third argument). The Court rationalized that if
Congress had intended the statute to cover individuals with correctable impair-
ments; this number would have been much higher. See id. (comparing forty-three
million disabled individuals with one hundred million having vision impairments
alone). Based on these three analyses, the Court felt it unnecessary to consider the
ADA's legislative history. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (disregarding need to evaluate
legislative history).
61. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487-88 (responding to dissent's concerns about ex-
clusion). The Court clarified its position on mitigating measures by stating that
"[t] he use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether an individ-
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Subsequently, in Murphy v. United Parcel Service,6 2 the Court applied its
mitigating measures analysis from Sutton, assessing the plaintiff in his med-
icated state when determining whether he was "substantially limited."63
The plaintiff, a mechanic suffering from high blood pressure, filed suit
under the ADA after being dismissed from his employment for failure to
meet the Department of Transportation ("DOT") standards for health cer-
tification.6 4 In his medicated state, the plaintiff could not prove that he
was substantially limited in a major life activity and thus the Court held,
pursuant to Sutton, that he could not bring a valid ADA claim of disability
discrimination. 6
5
Finally, in Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,66 the Court considered a new
twist on the mitigating measures framework. 67 The plaintiff, suffering
from amblyopia, a condition leading to monocular vision, sued his former
employer for firing him as a commercial truck driver due to his failure to
meet the DOT vision standards, despite his acquisition of a waiver from
the DOT.68 In holding that the plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA,
the Court focused on his body's own ability to compensate for his impair-
ment.69 Considering this compensation as any other mitigating measure,
the Court did not find the plaintiff to be substantially limited.70 The
Court concluded that there is "no principled basis for distinguishing be-
tween measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and de-
vices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the
ual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations an individ-
ual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting." Id. at 488.
62. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
63. See Fishman, supra note 14, at 2027-28 (citing application of Sutton in Mur-
phy v. United Parcel Serv., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Kan. 1996)).
64. See McDonnell, supra note 12, at 475-76 (reciting facts and procedural his-
tory of Murphy). When the plaintiff was initially hired, he was erroneously certified
in spite on his hypertension. See also Fishman, supra note 14, at 2027-28 (noting
facts). Upon later retesting, his high blood pressure was detected, and he was
fired. See id. at 2028 (indicating adverse employment action).
65. See Fishman, supra note 14, at 2028 (discussing Court's application of Sut-
ton holding to plaintiff in Murphy). According to the plaintiffs own physician,
when medicated the plaintiff's high blood pressure does not substantially limit his
abilities to perform major life activities. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519, 521 (evaluat-
ing plaintiff's disability in light of mitigation). The Court refused to consider the
issue of evaluating a disability when a person is limited despite medication or ex-
periences negative side effects as a result of taking the medication. See id. at 521
(leaving question open for consideration in future litigation).
66. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
67. See id. at 565 (addressing self-compensation by body systems).
68. See id. at 559-60 (describing facts of case).
69. See id. at 565 (questioning Ninth Circuit's suggestion that plaintiffs ability
to compensate be ignored in analysis). The Court recognized that his brain devel-
oped "subconscious mechanisms for coping with [his] visual impairment and thus
his body compensate[d] for his disability." Id. (describing plaintiffs self-compen-
sation for impair-ment).
70. See id. at 567 (requiring plaintiff with monocular vision to prove substan-
tial limitation).
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body's own systems.' 7 1 The Sutton trilogy, the name by which these three
cases are often referred, ultimately clarified any discrepancies among the
circuit courts as to the role of mitigation in the determination of disabili-
ties: a court must consider mitigating measures, artificial or otherwise, in
assessing whether an individual falls within the protected class of
disability.
72
III. EMORY V. ASTRAZENECA PHARmAcEUTicALs: RECOGNIZING
DISABILITIES IN SPITE OF SELF-ACHIEVEMENT
A. Facts and Procedural Background
While the Supreme Court trilogy closed the door on many ADA
claims, the Third Circuit in Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals73 reminds
plaintiffs and practitioners that there is still room for protection, particu-
larly for disabled individuals with many life accomplishments and suc-
cesses.74 Born with cerebral palsy, Mr. Alvin Emory had worked as a
custodian for AstraZeneca for more than twenty-seven years. 75 Over a pe-
riod of twelve years, he made unsuccessful bids for ten different internal
promotions, many of which he was not qualified for without accommoda-
tion.76 As a result of his cerebral palsy, Emory endured numerous physical
impairments, including permanent partial paralysis on his right side and a
deformed right hand, arm and leg.7 7 He also experienced mental limita-
tions, being placed in Special Education classes at a young age. 78 At work,
Emory required verbal instructions and needed hands-on or a combina-
71. Id. at 565-66 (extending concept of mitigating measures). See Nicastro,
supra note 2, at 364 (discussing Albertson's).
72. See Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 796-97 (discussing how Court ad-
dressed significance of mitigating measures in interpretation of ADA).
73. 401 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2005).
74. See generally id. (finding genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff's sub-
stantial limitations despite plaintiffs many life achievements).
75. See id. at 175 (discussing plaintiffs employment). Emory was the only em-
ployee at his plant who still held his custodial position after twenty-five years of
employment. See id. (asserting capabilities and dedication of plaintiff).
76. See id. at 175-76 (noting plaintiffs application for "several permanent
higher-paying jobs" that he was not qualified for without accommodation due to
his impairments).
77. See id. at 175 (describing physical limitations). Emory's permanent im-
pairment pervades 50% of his right upper extremity and 25% of his right lower
extremity. See id. (detailing extent of physical impairment). Despite physical, oc-
cupational and speech therapy, Emory was incapable of lifting anything or per-
forming activities that require the use of both hands. See id. at 175-76 (discussing
limitations due to physical impairment). Due to his inability to open and close his
right thumb, Emory has trouble with "right-handed gripping." See id. at 176 (re-
porting Emory's difficulty in performing manual tasks).
78. See id. (noting that "in 2003, Emory scored a Full Scale I.Q. of 77, placing
him in the borderline range of intellectual performance and in the 6th percentile
of the general population").
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tion visual and verbal approach to training, as opposed to simply reading a
manual.
79
Despite these limitations, "Emory ha[d], since adolescence, consist-
ently endeavored to challenge himself and to participate in various civic
and community activities." 80 As a teenager, he served as a volunteer
firefighter and also performed as a clown in the Shriners' Circus.8 1 Fur-
ther, Emoryjoined a "team responsible for mediating local disputes" and
recently was hired to perform part-time cleaning work for a local temple. 82
Emory, determined to advance at AstraZeneca, upon the promotion
of another employee, took on a temporary role as "acting Second Shift
Supervisor," serving in such capacity for two years.8 3 Hoping to improve
his chances for promotion, Emory requested an assessment at a learning
center, but his Human Resources Director refused.84 Furthermore, upon
receiving a block of time from AstraZeneca for computer training, his in-
structor recommended to AstraZeneca that "voice-activated software" be
installed for his use; however, no accommodations were ever made.8 5
When Emory was overlooked for the permanent Second Shift Supervi-
sor position, despite his two years of service as acting Second Shift Supervi-
sor, Emory filed suit against AstraZeneca claiming violation of the ADA
and the Delaware Handicapped Persons Act.8 6 To establish his disability
claim, Emory asserted that he was substantially limited "in the major life
activities of walking, learning and performing manual tasks." 87 The dis-
trict court, however, while recognizing that Emory was somewhat limited
in some tasks, focused on his numerous civic endeavors and achievements,
79. See id. at 177 (noting need for accommodation of mental limitations).
When applying for the mechanic position, Emory failed the required test on five
occasions, even including once when he was given the test orally. See id. (discuss-
ing difficulty even with some accommodation).
80. Id.
81. See id. (describing activities).
82. See id. (discussing civic responsibilities).
83. See id. (examining temporary supervisory role). During this time, Emory
faced much criticism and embarrassment at the expense of other supervisors. See
id. at 177-78 (noting criticism for math, spelling and grammar mistakes, as well as
taunts by supervisor who called him "Rainman").
84. See id. at 178 (recognizing denial for requested assessment).
85. See id. (discussing outside recommendation as to proper accommodation
for Emory's limitations).
86. See id. (asserting final adverse employment action and subsequent legal
action taken). Emory claimed "discrimination in the form of failure to promote
and failure to provide reasonable accommodations." Id. (discussing claims filed
with district court).
87. See id. (depicting Emory's claim for ADA protection).
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holding that Emory's limitations were not substantial. 88 As a result, the
court granted summary judgment for AstraZeneca.8 9
B. The Third Circuit's Perspective
While the district court's decision seemed to indicate the end of pro-
tection for well-accomplished, impaired individuals, the Third Circuit rec-
ognized the inappropriate focus of the district court's analysis and
reasserted the true purpose behind the ADA.90 According to the Third
Circuit, Congress enacted the ADA with the intent of providing disabled
individuals with "the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to
pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably fa-
mous."9 1 The court, looking to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines re-
garding the ADA and its amicus curiae brief filed in this case, noted that
affirming the district court's ruling would undermine that very purpose of
equal opportunity. 9
2
88. See id. at 178-79 ("Although Mr. Emory has some limitations in his ability
to grip, carry and manipulate objects and needs assistance in accomplishing some
household chores, childcare duties and activities involving his right side, his limita-
tions are not substantial or severe."). While the district court recognized Emory's
limitations in literacy, it held that these limitations also failed to be substantial,
"primarily because of the challenges Emory was courageous enough to undertake
and, in some instances, overcome." See id. at 179 (focusing on Emory's high school
graduation, updated computer skills, family mediator certification and firefighter
position). The court also noted that Emory consistently "earned positive perform-
ance evaluations" during his employment with AstraZeneca. See id. (recognizing
effective performance during twenty-six year employment).
89. See id. at 178 (asserting procedural posture of case).
90. See id. at 180 (distinguishing district court's ruling from congressional in-
tent behind ADA).
91. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (a) (9) (West 2006)) (recognizing intent
for broader scope of ADA protection). In passing the ADA, Congress wanted to
address the persistence of unfair discrimination against the disabled, not just to
"provide piecemeal protection to only those with the most tragic or obvious im-
paimients." See id. (emphasizing true purpose for enactment, particularly in light
of district court's contrary ruling).
92. See id. (examining EEOC's position on "substantially limits" and ADA's
scope). In its amicus curiae brief, the EEOC urged for a reversal of the district
court's finding, asserting a concern that ignoring evidence of the substantial im-
pact of Emory's impairment on his daily life would "deprive [other] victims of the
ability to challenge discriminatory acts.... " See id. (expressing need for protection
of Emory in light of future plaintiffs). The EEOC's interpretive guidelines define
"substantially limits" as an inability or significant restriction in the condition, man-
ner or duration in which a person performs a major life activity compared to an
average unimpaired person. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1)) (providing
guidance in interpretation of ambiguous part of statute). For a discussion of "sub-
stantially limits" and the EEOC's suggested factors for consideration, see supra
notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
In Emory, the Third Circuit treated the EEOC's guidelines as significantly per-
suasive to its analysis. 401 F.3d at 180 (illustrating ample discussion of EEOC's
stance). While Congress granted the EEOC "authority to issue non-legislative
guidelines for Title I [of the ADA] regarding employment discrimination [,]" these
regulations are only persuasive and not binding on the judicial branch. See Nicas-
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The Third Circuit centered its analysis on its interpretation of the
"substantially limits" requirement of the ADA.9 3 Deferring to the inquiry
set forth in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District,94 the court compared the
conditions, manner or duration under which an impaired individual is
able to perform a major life activity with that of an "average person in the
general population."95 In Taylor, the Third Circuit reversed a district
court's grant of summary judgment for the employer school district, not-
ing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
plaintiffs mental illness was substantially limiting her ability to think even
though she was taking medication. 96 In Emory, the Third Circuit explored
this comparison between the performance of an impaired individual ver-
sus that of an "average" person by examining the EEOC interpretive
guidelines which echo the inquiry of Taylor.
9 7
In reversing the district court's holding, the Third Circuit emphasized
that "[w]hat a plaintiff confronts, not overcomes, is the measure of sub-
stantial limitation under the ADA." 98 The court opined that sheer will
power, planning abilities, cognitive coping skills and learned accommoda-
tions do not negate the fact that activities may still be substantially more
difficult for an impaired individual when compared with one not suffering
tro, supra note 2, at 366-67 (emphasizing lack of authority to define disability); see
also Kimmel, supra note 27, at 751 (noting usefulness of clarity provided by EEOC).
In Sutton, because there was no dispute between parties with regards to EEOC
regulations, the Supreme Court found no reason to rule on what deference was
due to such regulations. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 480 (1999)
(examining role of EEOC in ADA cases defining protected class).
93. See Emory, 401 F.3d at 179-83 (analyzing degree of Emory's limitation in
major life activities of performing manual tasks and learning). In making its deter-
mination, the Third Circuit considered Supreme Court cases, prior Third Circuit
decisions, the stance of other circuits and the suggested guidelines from the
EEOC. See id. (addressing various authorities for analysis).
94. 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999).
95. See Emory, 401 F.3d at 179-80 (citing Taylor, 184 F.3d at 307) (noting es-
sence of substantial limitation inquiry).
96. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 309 (recognizing sufficient evidence on issue of
"substantially limited"). The plaintiff in Taylor had worked for twenty years as the
principal's secretary at an elementary school. See id. at 302 (describing employ-
ment relationship). After spending time in a psychiatric institution where she was
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, the plaintiff continued to take lithium in order to
control her mental illness. See id. at 302-03 (summarizing impairment and mitigat-
ing measure). Following her return to work, the plaintiff received nine discipli-
nary notices from her supervisor before being placed on probation and ultimately
terminated. See id. at 304 (discussing adverse employment action). In questioning
the plaintiff's substantial limitations, the Third Circuit stated that simply because
the plaintiff "may not have experienced problems every day does not defeat her
claim." See id. at 309 (reconsidering relationship between frequency of problems
and "substantial limitation").
97. See Emoy, 401 F.3d at 180 (quoting EEOC interpretive guidelines on "sub-
stantially limits" and relevant factors). For a discussion of the role of the EEOC in
ADA interpretation, see supra note 92.
98. See id. at 181 (presenting appropriate focus for determining substantial
limitation).
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from such impairment.9 9 More specifically, the Third Circuit opened the
door for future plaintiffs with learning disabilities through its characteriza-
tion of learning as a major life activity. 1° ° The court discussed the nature
and severity of Emory's impairment, the permanency of his condition and
the significant impact on his life.' 0 ' Seeking guidance from the First Cir-
cuit, the Third Circuit considered Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service,10 2 in
which the court acknowledged a plaintiffs substantial limitation in lifting
items notwithstanding her extraordinary efforts to compensate through
the use of various learned techniques.' 0 3 In conclusion, the Third Circuit
held that the ADA's focus should not be "on whether the individual has
the courage to participate in the major life activity .... but, rather, on
whether [he] faces significant obstacles when [he] does so."104
C. Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals in Light of Mitigating
Measures in the Third Circuit
In Emory, the Third Circuit's focus on obstacles encountered, as op-
posed to coping mechanisms employed, tends to distinguish the protec-
tion available to individuals who compensate for their impairments by
means of learned accommodations from those who compensate through
artificial means such as medication. 10 5 Just two months prior to the Emory
99. See id. (citing Ordahl v. Forward Tech. Indus., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1028-
29) (D. Minn. 2004)) (recognizing possibility of disability despite self-accomplish-
ment). In relating this principle to the facts in Emory, the Third Circuit noted:
the fact that Emory has been able to become a productive member of
society by having a family, working, and serving his community does not
negate the significant disability-related obstacles he has overcome to
achieve, nor does it undermine his inability, or significantly restricted
ability, to learn and perform numerous manual tasks of central impor-
tance to daily life.
Id. (examining evidence of Emory's will and perseverance offered by AstraZeneca).
100. See generally id. at 182-83 (analyzing substantial limitation on major life
activity of learning).
101. See id. at 183 (applying each of three factors proposed by EEOC's inter-
pretive guidelines for determining whether individual is substantially limited). For
further discussion of the "substantially limits" requirement and its relevant factors,
see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
102. 283 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002).
103. See Emoiy, 401 F.3d at 182 (citing Gillen, 283 F.3d at 22) (recognizing key
question focusing on obstacles). In Gillen, the First Circuit found the plaintiff to
be substantially limited in her ability to lift, asserting that her ability to lift more
weight than others does not negate her disability because the "manner in which
she lifts and the conditions under which she can lift will be significantly restricted
because she only has one available limb." 283 F.3d at 23 (addressing substantial
limitation because of need for artificial mitigating measure).
104. See Emory, 401 F.3d at 183 (quoting Gillen, 283 F.3d at 22) (establishing
focus for evaluating ADA claims in Third Circuit).
105. Compare Emory, 401 F.3d at 181 (overlooking substantial achievements
due to developed cognitive coping skills in disability determination) with Sutton v.
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decision, the Third Circuit highlighted its interpretation of Sutton and mit-
igating measures in dicta in Collins v. Prudential Investment & Retirement
Services.106 The plaintiff in Collins filed a disability discrimination claim,
asserting that her Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD")1 0 7
substantially impaired her ability to think, learn, concentrate and remem-
ber.10 3 While rejecting her claim on numerous grounds, the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's alternative holding that the plaintiff was not
disabled in her medicated state.1 0 9 Further, the court emphasized that
106. 119 F. App'x 371, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2005) (examining Sutton analysis in
light of ADHD factual scenario).
107. The U.S. Surgeon General and ICD-9-CM (International Classification of
Disease Revised Edition 2005) define ADHD as a "neurological deficit classified as
'metabolic encephalopathy' affecting the release and homeostasis of neurological
chemicals and the functioning of the limbic system." See WikiHealth.com, Atten-
tion-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, http://www.wikihealth.com/Attentiondeficit
disorder (last visited Sept. 10, 2006) (defining ADHD). "According to 2002 data
from the [Center for Disease Control and Prevention's] annual National Health
Interview Survey, released in 2004, nearly 4 million children younger than 18 in
the United States had been diagnosed with [ADHD]." Id. (citing CDC "National
Health Interview, 2002" (March, 2004), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr
_10/srllO221.pdf (discussing general incidence of ADHD)).
The disorder is characterized by "pervasive inattention and/or hyperactivity-
impulsivity" and results in "significant functional impairment." See Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention: Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/adhd/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2006) (providing gen-
eral statistics and information on ADHD). Moreover, ADHD "interferes with a
person's ability to stay on task and to exercise age-appropriate inhibition." Na-
tional Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) Attention Deficit-
Hyperactivity Disorder Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/
adhd/adhd.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2006) (defining ADHD, possible treatment
and prognosis).
108. See Collins, 119 F. App'x at 374 (specifying major life activities under ADA
analysis). After thirteen months of training, Collins was fired from her job at Pru-
dential due to her inability to perform the financial transactions component of her
job. See id. at 372-73 (noting alleged adverse employment action). During the
course of her employment, Collins received eleven months of training beyond the
normal training period for a typical employee in her position, yet she was unable
to master the required skills. See id. (recognizing Prudential's reasoning behind
termination). Approximately two months after her termination, Collins was diag-
nosed with ADHD. See id. at 373 (asserting plaintiffs impairment).
109. See id. at 378-79 (addressing district court's discussion of mitigating mea-
sures tinder Sutton). Collins testified that she took Adderol and Ambien to correct
her ADHD-Adderol to help her to focus and Ambien to help her sleep. See id. at
378 (discussing medication and evaluation of disability). Moreover, Collins em-
phasized the need for attention to timing in medicating, asserting that "she has to
take Ambien to counteract Adderol and, therefore 'the medications actually make
Collins more impaired than the general population."' Id. (presenting example of
need to correlate medication times to help in ability to focus and to eliminate
trouble sleeping).
Regardless of this mitigating measures analysis, there were several flaws in Col-
lins' claim that required the Third Circuit to affirm the district court's grant of
judgment as a matter of law for Prudential Retirement and Investment Services.
See id. at 372 (asserting procedural posture and holding of Third Circuit case). To
support her claim, Collins simply relied on her own testimony, which the court
found to be persuasive in illustrating her life successes, yet ineffective in demon-
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"[t]he test for determining the effect of mitigating measures is not
whether the mitigating measures constitute a cure." 10
While the Third Circuit seems to be promoting the same theme in
both Emory and Collins-that disability determinations must focus not on
the perfect outcome or the individual's remarkable accomplishments, but
on the difficult steps along the way-its factual analysis creates a disparity
in protection."' Those who overcome obstacles through the use of
learned coping skills arguably have a greater chance at protection than
those who take medication to compensate for their impairments. 1 2 In
fact, the use of medication seems to negate the very existence of obstacles
in the eyes of the judiciary. " 3 Moreover, the Collins court specifically em-
phasized the plaintiffs significant accomplishments as proof that she was
not substantially limited;' 14 whereas just a few months later, the Emory
court failed to mention Collins and insisted that the determination should
not depend on the plaintiffs achievements.' 1 5
strating any substantial limitations. See id. at 375-76 (depicting difficulties caused
by Collins' ADHD as moderate at most). Moreover, the Third Circuit concluded
that Prudential did not have notice of her impairment when it made the employ-
ment decision. See id. at 380-81 (discussing Prudential's knowledge of disability
because diagnosis occurred after termination).
110. See id. at 379 (rejecting Collins' arguments and directing determination
away from whether mitigation constitutes cure).
111. Compare Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharm., 401 F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2005)
("What a plaintiff confronts, not overcomes, is the measure of substantial limita-
tion under the ADA.") with Collins, 119 F. App'x at 378-79 ("The test for determin-
ing the effect of mitigating measures is not whether the mitigating measures
constitute a cure.").
112. Compare Emory, 401 F.3d at 183 (finding genuine issue of fact as to disa-
bility) with Collins, 119 F. App'x at 379 (affirming district court's alternative ruling
that Collins was not substantially limited in medicated state).
113. Cf Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) ("[A] person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has
an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it does not 'substantially limi [t]'
a major life activity."); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-67 (1999)
(emphasizing body's ability to compensate for vision impairments); Collins, 119 F.
App'x at 378-79 (characterizing ADHD impairment as not substantially limiting).
114. See Collins, 119 F. App'x at 376, 378, 378 n.7 (asserting that Collins' testi-
mony concerning her work, academic and community involvement contradicted
claim of substantial limitation in major life activities of thinking, learning, remem-
bering and concentrating). The Third Circuit stressed that Collins had been
"gainfully employed since her teen years," working as a supermarket cashier, a data
processor, a bookkeeper and a tax preparer. See id. at 376 (noting work history).
She also earned an associate degree in accounting, graduating cum laude. See id.
(indicating academic success). Comparing Collins' testimony to that of a plaintiff
with multiple sclerosis who filed suit in a 2002 Third Circuit case, the court as-
serted that if Collins had suffered from ADHD since childhood, "it would seem
that the problems she had at Prudential would have plagued her for her entire life
and would have prevented her from achieving the things she did before she was
hired by Prudential." Id. at 378 n.7 (contrasting Collins with plaintiff in Gagliardo
v. Connaught Labs., 311 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 2002)).
115. SeeEmory, 401 F.3d at 181 (noting that "the fact that Emory has been able
to become a productive member of society by having a family, working and serving
2006] CASEBRIEF 1049
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These cases cause a plaintiff to walk a fine line in the search for ADA
protection in the Third Circuit.' 16 They illustrate how the Third Circuit's
interpretation of two similar factual scenarios can lead to different re-
suits. 1 17 Since the decisions of Emory and Collins, other cases within the
Third Circuit jurisdiction have affirmed this nuanced distinction of ADA
analysis.] 18
V. NUANCED DISTINCTIONS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
In recognizing Emory's disability in light of his life accomplishments,
the Third Circuit highlighted the very essence of Congress's reasoning be-
hind the ADA's enactment: to provide disabled people "the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities that our free
society is justifiably famous."" 9 Congress did not emphasize equal treat-
ment; it emphasized equal opportunity. 120 This goal requires employers
to give their disabled employees the tools necessary to perform their job
responsibilities just as the average employee is able to do.12 1 In Emory, the
Third Circuit appreciated that this purpose could not be fulfilled by pro-
viding "piecemeal protection to only those with the most tragic or obvious
impairments.' 2
2
While the Third Circuit did not specifically discuss mitigating mea-
sures in its Emory analysis, its ruling inherently distinguished an individ-
ual's "force of will, learned accommodations and careful planning" from
the subconscious mechanisms an individual's brain develops to compen-
his community does not negate the significant disability-related obstacles he has
overcome").
116. For a discussion of the nuanced distinction between artificial mitigation
and cognitive coping, see infra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
117. For a comparison of the Third Circuit's analyses in Emory and Collins, see
supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
118. See Shultz v. Potter, 142 F. App'x 598, 599-600 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting
diabetic plaintiff's lack of substantial limitation when she takes insulin and
monitors her blood sugar); Kurten v. Hanger Prosthetic &, Orthotics, 402 F. Supp.
2d 572, 587 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (recognizing error in defendant's focus on plaintiffs
achievements).
119. See Emory, 401 F.3d at 180 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (a) (9) (West 2006))
(addressing purpose behind ADA).
120. See § 12101(a) (8) (noting the "Nation's proper goals regarding individu-
als with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, inde-
pendent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals").
121. See Fishman, supra note 14, at 2024-25 ("The ADA mandates that the
employer make any reasonable accommodations necessary to .. .enable [the dis-
abled individual] to enjoy the equal opportunities that are available to other
employees.").
122. See Emory, 401 F.3d at 180 (asserting that opposite finding with regard to
substantial impact of Emory's impairment would "deprive victims of the ability to
challenge discriminatory acts, and thereby undermine the ADA's purpose").
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sate for impairments.' 23 The Supreme Court in Albertson's, however, spe-
cifically stated that there is no distinction between artificial mitigating
measures and "measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the
body's own systems."1 24 By shifting the focus of its analysis to the obstacles
that one encounters, the Third Circuit treated one's personal courage and
persistent efforts in performing life's daily activities differently than the
body's own coping mechanisms. 12 5 This distinction is what separates the
two individuals described in the introductory hypothetical; one is disabled
under the ADA despite significant life achievements because he developed
his own non-traditional skills for addressing his impairment, while the
other is not disabled when evaluated in his medicated state because he is
not deemed substantially limited.126 Though the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the ADA's protection through its interpretation of mitigating mea-
sures, 127 the Third Circuit created room for plaintiffs with learning
disabilities to receive protection, regardless of their many life
accomplishments. 12
8
The greater theoretical reasons behind the Third Circuit's interpreta-
tion are unknown and essentially unspoken. 129 Perhaps the court realized
the difficulty in quantitatively determining the benefits of cognitive coping
measures as compared to the benefits of medication.' 3 0 Maybe the court
is inherently making a value judgment, asserting that personal achieve-
ments are somehow arguably more deserving of protection than medica-
123. Compare Emory, 401 F.3d at 181 (quoting Ordahl v. Forward Tech. Indus.,
301 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1028-29 (D. Minn. 2004)) (establishing proper focus of disa-
bility deter-minations) with Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565
(1999) (discussing body's compensating abilities).
124. See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66 (analogizing artificial means and self-
accommodation).
125. See Emory, 401 F.3d at 181-83 (analyzing plaintiffs substantial limitations
in major life activities such as performing manual tasks and learning).
126. See introductory hypothetical, supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's trilogy, see supra notes 49-72
and accompanying text.
128. See Emory, 401 F.3d at 179-83 (interpreting limitations due to plaintiffs
mental impairments in way that allows ADA protection). One commentator as-
serts that:
'self-accommodations' ought to be considered by the courts when they
determine whether a claimant qualifies for reasonable accommodations
under the statute. The cognitive coping mechanisms employed by a per-
son with a learning disability, however, should not be classified by the
courts as 'self-accommodations.' These mechanisms are better viewed as
achievements.
Nicastro, supra note 2, at 355 (establishing premises for providing learning dis-
abled individuals with reasonable accommodations).
129. See generally Emory, 401 F.3d at 174-83 (resting analysis on EEOC guide-
lines, ADA's purpose and standards set forth in other jurisdictions).
130. Cf Nicastro, supra note 2, at 356 (establishing reasons why "cognitive




Fordyce: The Elusive Protected Class - Who Is Worthy under the Americans w
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tion.13 1 Perhaps in light of the Supreme Court's trilogy, the Third Circuit
saw an opportunity to allow some individuals to avoid "walk[ing] [the]
fine line between proving that a disability is severe but not so severe that it
prevents essential work requirements if accommodations are proided"-a
line that is particularly difficult for plaintiffs to walk when the court is
required to consider mitigating measures. 132 Looking at the bare bones
arguments, maybe, as set forth in its opinion, the Third Circuit simply
applied the statute, considering the language as well as the purpose, to the
facts of Emory's case and came to the most just decision. 1 33 Regardless of
its underlying perspective, the Third Circuit appropriately granted plain-
tiffs, who are substantially limited in major life activities, the opportunity
to realistically make that showing. 134
131. Cf id. (addressing ethical considerations of distinguishing between cog-
nitive coping and self-accommodation). Discounting the efforts of learning dis-
abled individuals to reach certain successes by equating cognitive coping and self-
accommodation, would "de-legitimate individual achievement." See id. (stressing
importance of labeling such skills as accomplishments). "It is the most ethical ap-
proach to treating learning disabilities as they exist in their present state." Id. at
370-71 (setting forth reasons not to "detach" mitigating measures in determining
whether learning disabled individual has disability under ADA).
Some individuals, however, view learning disabilities more skeptically than
physical impairments, believing such difficulties stem from "personal deviance or
shortcomings." See Ranseen & Parks, supra note 12, at 97 ("An unwillingness to
view LD/ADHD as disabilities in need of accommodation might be seen as addi-
tional confirmation of this societal bias."). Adopting this skeptical view, one com-
mentator argues against providing special testing accommodations to learning
disabled students in professional schools and suggests that students alleging disa-
bilities misuse the ADA to receive extra opportunities to excel. See Knauff, supra
note 15, at 85, 109-10 (describing hypothetical of ADA abuse in law school).
132. See Ranseen & Parks, supra note 12, at 89 ("Seeking protection based on
the ADA may force an individual to argue mutually exclusive possibilities regard-
ing his or her disability-that it is both severe and not severe."). The Supreme
Court's stance on mitigating measures creates a difficult situation for plaintiffs who
require medication to compensate for their impairments. See Kimmel, supra note
27, at 749-50 (explaining negative impact of Sutton trilogy decision on ADA claims
of over fifteen million diabetics). For example, consider the case of a diabetic
plaintiff who, in an effort to control her diabetes, needs to regularly maintain her
blood sugar levels, eat and rest periodically and give herself insulin shots through-
out the day. Cf id. at 761-62 (pointing to speculation after court's decision in
Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 15, 18 (Ct. App. 1999)). If she
is evaluated in her medicated state, the court could likely find that she is not dis-
abled, as she is not substantially limited in major life activities when she is able to
take her medication. Cf id. (same). Without being disabled, she is not entitled to
accommodations. Cf id. (same). If, however, her employer does not provide her
the time during work hours to monitor her condition as needed, she may become
substantially limited. Cf id. (same). This is a catch-22; essentially she is not dis-
abled if she is given accommodations, but she is not necessarily given accommoda-
tions if she is not disabled. Cf id. (same). This plaintiff must walk this difficult
path and show the court that she is substantially limited in spite of her medication,
perhaps in conjunction with her medication. Cf id. (same).
133. See generally Emory, 401 F.3d at 174-83 (presenting concern for providing
disabled individuals with ADA protection).
134. Cf id. at 183 (quoting Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., 283 F.3d 11, 22
(1st Cir. 2002)) ("When evaluating claims brought under the ADA, 'the focus is
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One commentator notes that "[t]he disabilities rights movement is
fighting for the right to participate fully in society, 'recognition of disabled
people as full human beings and elimination of physical and attitudinal
barriers to their full participation in society.1"1 35 If the Third Circuit had
discounted Emory's showing of substantial limitations by emphasizing his
accomplishments, it would have prevented such a goal from being
achieved.1 36 That decision would have sent a cautionary message to per-
sons with learning disabilities that if they achieve too much, they may not
be entitled to the very accommodations that allowed them to reach such
heights in the first place. 3 7 "Such demoralization will not inspire individ-
uals to continue to make efforts to be integrated into society." 1
38
While the Third Circuit encompassed many persons with learning dis-
abilities within its umbrella of interpreted ADA protection, several ques-
tions remain unanswered. 139 First, what will result if an individual with an
impairment, such as ADHD, refuses to take available medication? 140 Per-
haps this will depend on the reason for the individual's refusal."'' In the
case of artificial mitigation, providing protection to a non-medicated indi-
vidual who establishes a substantial limitation while denying such protec-
tion to a similarly-situated individual who chooses to mitigate will lead to
not on whether the individual has the courage to participate in the major life activ-
ity despite [his] impairment, but rather, on whether [he] faces significant obsta-
cles when [he] does so.'").
135. Nicastro, supra note 2, at 357 (quoting Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation
Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the 'Disability' Definition in the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1405, 1418 (1999)).
136. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis and why such achieve-
ments were not the focus of its determination, see supra notes 90-104 and accom-
panying text.
137. Cf Nicastro, supra note 2, at 370-71, 375 (presenting ethical considera-
tions for dealing with learning disabilities).
138. Nicastro, supra note 2, at 375 (asserting that failing to adopt perspective
[similar to Third Circuit] would perpetuate stereotypes and discrimination).
139. For a discussion of the effect of the Third Circuit's analysis on scope of
ADA protection, see supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
140. For a discussion of the refusal to medicate impairments and its repercus-
sions on ADA protection, see generally Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 785-817
(questioning duty to mitigate and potential loss of protection).
141. See Burke & Abel, supra note 27, at 805-06 (considering difficulties in
mandating intake of available medication); Fishman, supra note 14, at 2033-40 (dis-
cussing cases where plaintiffs failed to mitigate). One commentator suggested that
in evaluating a plaintiffs decision not to mitigate a correctable disability, the
courts should consider factors such as
recommendations of physicians; the cost of the recommended treatment,
including insurance coverage; religious objections sincerely held; and the
nature and severity of potential side effects and health risks associated
with the use of the proposed treatment option, including possible allergic
reactions, the potential for long-term addiction, and debilitating effects.
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inconsistent results. 142 At the same time, however, there is often height-
ened debate, particularly regarding ADHD, concerning the propriety of
prescription medication. 143 Moreover, is it appropriate for the court to
make value judgments on an individual's personal medical decisions? 144
Along the same lines, what if an individual with a learning disability is
unable to afford such medication? 145 Because the purpose of the ADA is
to assure equal opportunity, denying a plaintiff protection due to a lack of
resources would seem unjust.1 46 Even in adopting this reasoning, how-
ever, the Third Circuit would still need to define the limits to this excep-
tion for financial difficulty.' 47 Further, while this may be relevant as to
discrimination in hiring cases, once a plaintiff has begun working and is
eligible for an employee health care plan, financial constraints would no
longer serve as an excuse for failing to mitigate a correctable
impairment.1
48
Finally, due to the individualized nature of the ADA inquiry, is the
Third Circuit's focus in Emory applicable on a wider scale? 149 For exam-
ple, in cases where an individual has been significantly successful, reaching
levels of professional education, at some point in the spectrum of interpre-
tation, do such achievements play a role in the ADA determinations?
1 50
Most likely, only future litigation will provide answers to these ques-
142. See Fishman, supra note 14, at 2039 (recognizing potential inconsistency
problem in mitigating measures analysis).
143. See Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/ADHD (last visited Sept. 10, 2006) (discussing controversy surrounding
ADD/ADHD); see also Gina Beltramo, Everybody's Children, 2 U.C. DAVIsJ. Juv. L. &
POL'Y 26, 27 (1997) (examining effect of ADD medication on children); Neil Ber-
liner, M.D., Views on Disorder Questioned by Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1996, at 13
(questioning emphasis on medication in ADD cases); Howard Markel, M.D., Grow-
ing Up on a Ritalin-Prozac Cocktail: Is This What Ricky Needs?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2000, at F6 (addressing medication of children).
144. See Fishman, supra note 14, at 2039 ("Inquiring into the medical risks of
available medications throws the court deep into the medical arena and forces it to
make choices regarding personal lifestyle.").
145. See id. at 2034-35 (examining Haworth v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., No.
97-2149-EEO, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6625 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 1998) (asserting that
financial inability should not be reason to deny ADA protection).
146. See Fishman, supra note 14, at 2035 (rationalizing outcomes of possible
future litigation surrounding mitigation and financial constraints).
147. Cf id. (recognizing need for future litigation to avoid inconsistent
outcomes).
148. Cf Kimmel, supra note 27, at 762 (addressing pre-Sutton analysis regard-
ing mitigating measures and financial concerns in Arnold v. United Parcel Serv.,
136 F.3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998)).
149. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's focus in Emory, see supra notes 90-
104 and accompanying text.
150. See Ranseen & Parks, supra note 12, at 99-100 (questioning effect of long-
term successful self-accommodation on disability determinations). Recognizing
that ADA determinations are made in comparison to the average person, the
courts have left open the issue of protection where an individual reached a level of
success greater than average with reliance on learned cognitive coping skills. See
id. (noting need for education in order to reduce tension between students, clini-
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tions.151 A self-achieving plaintiff seeking protection, however, must stress
the true purpose of the ADA and refocus the court, as in Emory, to the
obstacles that he or she must face on a day-to-day basis due to his or her
impairment, rather than on the endeavors he or she has been persistent
and diligent enough to accomplish.
1 52
V. CONCLUSION
While well-intentioned, the ADA, in its ambiguous and complicated
state, has been unsympathetic to many plaintiffs seeking its protection.
15 3
Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has increasingly. narrowed its
scope, continuously redefining the elusive class of "disability." 15 4 In the
midst of this narrowing trend, however, the Third Circuit reemphasized
the ADA's essential goals of providing equal opportunity and ending stere-
otypical discrimination. 155 In Emory, the court recognized that the ADA
should not be used as a means of discouraging plaintiffs from reaching
success in all aspects of life; rather, ADA determinations should focus on
the substantial obstacles that individuals face in reaching that success. 156
In light of Emory, practitioners in the Third Circuit have the opportu-
nity to emphasize the difficulties that their clients face in performing ma-
jor life activities, notwithstanding opposing counsel's possible attempts to
minimize such substantial limitations by focusing on the clients' life
achievements and accomplishments. 157 By emphasizing actual difficulties
faced, individuals with learning disabilities who rely on Emory have a
cians and testing organization on these issues). One commentator ponders this
issue with learning disabilities and ADHD impairments:
Obviously, a student's limitations in learning might be more pronounced
within advanced academic environments, as would be true of anyone in
the general population. However, does the ADA's average person crite-
rion set an objective standard, even if imperfect, that disqualifies a deter-
mination of developmental disability after a long history of successful self-
accommodation, as suggested by the Sutton (1999) ruling? If so, it would
seem unlikely that any student who has graduated from college and
achieved average performance without accommodations would ever be
considered developmentally disabled on the basis of the ADA.
Id. (questioning applicability of Sutton to developmental disabilities).
151. For a discussion of questions unanswered by the Third Circuit, see supra
notes 119-50 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of Emory's ADA claim and the Third Circuit's analysis,
see supra notes 73-104 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the statute's background and inherent ambiguity, see
supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases narrowing protection to individ-
uals substantially limited in their mitigated states, see supra notes 49-72 and accom-
panying text.
155. See Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharm., 401 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2005) (cre-
ating room for providing statutory protection to individuals in need).
156. See id. at 181 (refusing to allow fact that Emory became "productive
member of society" to negate claim for ADA protection).
157. Cf id. at 183 (focusing on obstacles and not plaintiff's courage).
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stronger basis for making successful showings of their substantial limita-
tions and thus, satisfying the protected class requirements. 158 By distin-
guishing cognitive coping skills from artificial mitigating measures and
self-compensation by one's body systems, the Third Circuit allows plaintiffs
within these factual settings to overcome the impediments to protection
set forth in the Supreme Court trilogy.'5 9
"By rejecting the Supreme Court's physical disabilities approach when
addressing the question of learning disabilities, society affirms that per-
sons with learning disabilities are capable of the same autonomous, self-
actualization that persons without disabilities achieve. 1 60 This is the mes-
sage that the Third Circuit sent to those individuals seeking ADA protec-
tion.1 6 1 Although not open-ended in its scope, the Third Circuit's ADA
interpretation appropriately enables at least one of the two plaintiffs in the
introductory hypothetical to seek remedial action as a result of disability
discrimination, allowing the plaintiff to be proud of his past accomplish-
ments and with the help of reasonable accommodations, reach new levels
of success in the future.
162
Elizabeth Fordyce
158. For a discussion of the Third Circuit analysis in Emory, see supra notes 90-
104 and accompanying text.
159. For a comparison of cognitive coping skills and mitigating measures in
the Third Circuit, see supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text. For an analysis
of the impact of this distinction of potential claims, see supra notes 118-38 and
accompanying text.
160. Nicastro, supra note 2, at 371 (addressing ethical considerations of Su-
preme Court's trilogy decisions in light of ADA's purpose).
161. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's stance, see supra notes 90-118 and
accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the introductory hypothetical, see supra notes 1-11
and accompanying text.
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